Investigating Modern Communication Technologies: The effect of Internet-based Communication Technologies on the Investigation Process by Simon, Matthew & Slay, Jill
Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law 
Volume 6 Number 4 Article 4 
2011 
Investigating Modern Communication Technologies: The effect of 
Internet-based Communication Technologies on the Investigation 
Process 
Matthew Simon 
University of South Australia 
Jill Slay 
University of South Australia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Simon, Matthew and Slay, Jill (2011) "Investigating Modern Communication Technologies: The effect of 
Internet-based Communication Technologies on the Investigation Process," Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law: Vol. 6 : No. 4 , Article 4. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2011.1106 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol6/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact commons@erau.edu. 
(c)ADFSL 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(4) 
 
35 
 
Investigating Modern Communication 
Technologies: The effect of Internet-based 
Communication Technologies on the Investigation 
Process 
Matthew Simon 
University of South Australia 
Mawson Lakes Boulevard 
Mawson Lakes, SA, 5095 
+61 8 8302 5688 
matthew.simon@unisa.edu.au 
 
Jill Slay 
University of South Australia 
Mawson Lakes Boulevard 
Mawson Lakes, SA, 5095 
+61 8 8302 25757 
jill.slay@unisa.edu.au 
 
ABSTRACT 
Communication technologies are commonplace in modern society. For many 
years there were only a handful of communication technologies provided by large 
companies, namely the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and mobile 
telephony; these can be referred to as traditional communication technologies. 
Over the lifetime of traditional communication technologies has been little 
technological evolution and as such, law enforcement developed sound methods 
for investigating targets using them. With the advent of communication 
technologies that use the Internet – Internet-based or contemporary 
communication technologies – law enforcement are faced with many challenges. 
This paper discusses these challenges and their potential impact. It first looks at 
what defines the two technologies then explores the laws and methods used for 
their investigation. It then looks at the issues of applying the current 
methodologies to the newer and fundamentally different technology. The paper 
concludes that law enforcement will be required to update their methods in order 
to remain effective against the current technology trends.  
Keywords: digital forensics, digital investigation, communication technologies, 
telecommunications interception, post mortem analysis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“when I was your age, 
the phone was tied to the wall with a kinky, twisty three and a half foot cord, 
it’s hard to believe but it had a ring that could not be turned off or ignored, 
we couldn’t choose the sound of the ring, it was just the sound we called ‘the phone’, 
we’d never heard of a ring tone”1 
 
Digital communication technologies are fundamental to modern society and form 
a worldwide network allowing people to communicate efficiently. Traditionally, 
there have been relatively few distinct communication technologies. PSTN and 
Mobile Phones have dominated the communications landscape forming a single 
conceptual network. These technologies can be thought of as traditional 
communication technology. Traditional communication networks have changed 
very little over their extensive lifespan. With the recent widespread adoption of 
the Internet, novel communication technologies are increasingly available. In 
contrast to traditional communication technologies these can be referred to as 
contemporary or Internet-based communication technologies. There are many 
advantages to using Internet-based communication technologies and these have 
been realised by both users and providers of services. However, such advantages 
are one side of the proverbial “double edged sword” and may be disadvantageous 
within other contexts. This is particularly relevant to law enforcement as 
contemporary communication technologies present significant challenges to the 
ability to gain evidence and intelligence about their use in an investigation.  
It is common for law enforcement agencies to conduct investigations as part of 
their duties. Recovering information about targets can be performed in many 
ways. Investigation methodologies may be thought of as a series of methods and 
procedures to recover information in a given context. Investigation methodologies 
for recovering information about a target’s communications are commonly 
employed by law enforcement. Traditional communication technologies have 
been in use for many years and have changed very little over this time. This has 
allowed the development of highly effective and rigorous investigation 
methodologies for these technologies. Internet-based communication technologies 
by contrast are very different. Their technological operation is based on a 
fundamentally different paradigm; this leads to several fundamental functional 
differences. Due to these inherent differences, the existing methodologies used by 
law enforcement may not be adequate for situations involving contemporary 
communication technologies and this is a significant problem as they are 
becoming more prevalent. 
In order to understand how the shift in technology affects investigation 
methodologies of law enforcement it necessary to understand the differences 
between the technologies. It is rudimentary to identify the primary technological 
difference however, it is necessary to delve deeper in order to find the issues that 
                                                 
1 George Hrab, “When I was Your Age”. Geologic Records, 2010 
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affect the investigation methodologies. An understanding of the underpinnings of 
all communication technologies is needed before exploring the specifics of both 
types individually. All technologies use the concept of ‘services’ to designate 
functions of the various parts of the system. An understanding of what these 
services are and do is necessary in order to understand holistically how 
communication systems operate. The concept of services is also tied closely to the 
legislation that affects communication technologies in Australia. By exploring the 
background and operation of traditional and contemporary communication 
technologies, certain properties of the latter can be identified that are contrary to 
the former. These properties embody functional differences, which can be used to 
explore in a practical manner where the weaknesses in the current methodologies 
are. 
The methodologies for investigation of communication technologies are 
comprised of three main methods: communications interception, access of 
retained information and post-mortem analysis. Each of these uses different 
vectors of access and gain different types of information; the situation context will 
dictate which should be used. These methods are well suited to the investigation 
of traditional communication technologies and it is a combination of many factors 
that contributes to their success. However, these methods may not be successful in 
many situations where contemporary communication technologies are being used. 
The reasons for this can be explored by looking at the application of the methods 
to traditional communication technologies and contrasting this with the known 
functional differences identified by comparing the technologies. This shows what 
properties of contemporary communication technologies are responsible for the 
ineffectiveness of the methods. The practical implications of the mismatch in 
methods can be further explored with a case study. Three separate incidences are 
presented that describe situations of criminal activity and how law enforcement 
used one of the investigation methods to gain information that was subsequently 
used as evidence in a court of law. A hypothetical alternative is then presented for 
each case to demonstrate how the methods used may have failed where the target 
used an Internet-based communication technology. 
This paper seeks to show how the shifting paradigm of communications is 
changing the requirements for law enforcement. It is important that they are able 
to carry out their role effectively in order to prevent or stop criminal activity. 
Knowing the failings of the current methodologies may help the development of 
new methodologies for the current environment. This paper provides a first step 
for carrying out future research in this direction. 
2. COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 
Traditional and contemporary communication technologies are tools that support 
human-to-human communication. The ways in which they operate to fulfil this 
task however is very different. Common to all types of technology is the concept 
of services. A holistic communication service is itself comprised of multiple 
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services. These form a hierarchy, with the conceptually lower service layers 
supporting the conceptually higher service layers. While any number of service 
layers can be employed, any holistic communication services can be 
conceptualised as being formed by two: the carrier and carriage service. The 
definitions of carrier service and carriage services depend on the context. A 
specific definition exists as defined by relevant legislation and a generic definition 
exists (defined here) that is more useful in the discussion of communication 
technologies in general. Understanding the structure of services is necessary in 
order to understand the operation of both traditional and contemporary 
communication technologies. 
A cursory study of traditional and contemporary communication technology is 
sufficient to define their fundamental differences. However, the high-level 
fundamental difference is not the issue central to the ineffectiveness of law 
enforcement methods for recovering information about contemporary 
communication technologies. To discover the functional differences between the 
two types of technologies, it is necessary to explore the background and operation 
of both. A comparison can then be made that explores the operational differences. 
As the goal of the paper is to explore why existing methods are not equally 
effective for contemporary communication technologies, it is necessary to identify 
the properties of this type of technology that cause the functional differences. 
This section looks at communication services as a background to the analysis 
operation of both contemporary and traditional communication technologies. 
After exploring both technologies, an in-depth analysis of the differences is 
conducted to identify the functional differences; these are defined as a set of 
properties of contemporary communication technologies. 
2.1 Communication Services 
In order to understand both traditional and contemporary communication systems, 
it is necessary to understand how multiple services are used and constructed 
overall to deliver a service to the customer. This is fundamental to the operation 
of all communication systems. As telecommunications in Australia are 
predominantly regulated under the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) 
(Telecommunications Act), it is also prudent to review the relevant definitions 
that the Act specifies. In order to maintain consistency, the following concepts are 
explored in terminology consistent with that used in the Telecommunications Act. 
This terminology is also consistent with related legislation such as the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act of 2001 (TIA Act).  
Under the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) there are two entities that provide 
two different services: carriers and carriage service providers (CSP). A carrier is 
a body that provides infrastructure (either physical or wireless) in order to carry 
signals between points (with one point is within Australia); such infrastructure 
forms part of the Australian Telecommunication Network (ATN). The role of a 
carrier is to supply a carrier service. This term is not specifically defined within 
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the Telecommunications Act but is convenient for describing the service provided 
by a carrier and is therefore used frequently herein. A carrier service provides a 
means of moving indiscriminate signals between two distinct points. The 
Australian telecommunications company Telstra operates as a carrier by 
maintaining a copper cable network. A CSP is an entity that supplies 
communication services using a carrier’s infrastructure. The service supplied by a 
CSP is called the carriage service. A carriage service is defined in the 
Telecommunications Act as “a service for carrying communications”. Telstra also 
operate as a CSP by supplying PSTN services to residential households. Many 
other companies in Australia also operate as CSPs by selling PSTN services to 
residential households over Telstra’s copper cable infrastructure. 
In any communication system, multiple service layers are employed. In the 
PSTN, the carrier service is the copper cable that is supplied to a location (such a 
residence). A telephone or another carriage service is then supplied on top of the 
carrier service. The supply of an Internet connection also has multilayer service 
architecture. In the case of an Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL), the 
copper line is again the carrier service. An alternative carrier service for an 
Internet feed is a coaxial cable or one of many wireless options. An Internet 
service provider then supplies, over the carrier service, the Internet feed and this is 
a carriage service.  
 
The definition of carrier and CSP based on the Telecommunications Act is very 
specific and is too restrictive when discussing communication systems more 
broadly. In general, the important factor is the relationship between the services. 
To this end, a carrier and carriage service will be used to define any pair of 
communication services where one ‘carries’ the other. Internet communications 
are a pertinent example of where this definition is more flexible. Figure 1 depicts 
an example network hierarchy and indicates how the layers relate to each other. In 
this example, the copper/PSTN and copper/ADSL have a carrier/carriage service 
structure as defined under the Telecommunications Act. Based on the more 
general definition as specified here, the ADSL/VoIP and ADSL/VPN have a 
carrier/carriage service structure. Moving one layer higher the VPN becomes the 
carrier over which a WWW and VoIP service is carried. 
www VoIP
VoIP VPN
ADSL PSTN
Copper
Carrier service is 
the copper. The 
ADSL and the 
PSTN are carriage 
services
Carrier service is 
the VPN. The www 
and VoIP are the 
carriage services 
Carrier service is 
the ADSL. The VPN 
and VoIP are 
carriage services
 
Figure 1: An example of a network hierarchy and a description of the  
carrier/carriage service layers. 
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This definition of carrier and carriage service will be used unless specifically 
stated. Where referring to service providers in relation to the Telecommunications 
Act specifically, the terms TA-carrier, TA-CSP, non TA-carrier and non TA-SCP 
will be used. The distinction is important when discussing legislation, for instance 
under the Telecommunications Act an ADSL connection is not seen as a carrier 
service and consequently is not lawfully bound as such. Additionally, if the VoIP 
service is not classified as a carriage service, it is not legally bound by the 
Telecommunications Act or the TIA Act. 
All communication technologies, whether traditional or contemporary, are 
generally comprised of two main services, the carrier and the carriage service. 
The exact meaning of these depends on whether the specific (that defined under 
the Telecommunications Act) or the generic definition is being used. 
Understanding what the services are and how they are combined to supply a 
complete communication service is important in understand the operation of both 
traditional and contemporary technologies, and furthermore to gain an 
appreciation for how they differ at a functional level.  
2.2 Traditional Communication Technologies 
Traditional communication technologies are telephony implementations that have 
existed for many years. This name ‘traditional’ is an accurate designation as this 
type of telephony technology has been well established in society and for the 
greater part of its existence, has been the sole implementation. The traditional 
telephone began its existence in 1876 when Alexander Graham Bell famously 
said, "Mr. Watson--Come here--I want to see you" to his assistant in the next 
room over an early telephone prototype. At this stage, the telephone was merely a 
shadow of what it would become. For well over 100 years, telephony technology 
has developed and integrated into all facets of society. In 2004, there were over 
two hundred million PSTN telephones in use in the United States alone 
(Wallingford, 2005). While the PSTN is based on a physical cable, mobile 
telephony was developed in the late 20
th
 century allowing users to keep their 
telephony service with them at all times. There are several common technologies 
on which mobile telephony is implemented including the very common Global 
System for Mobile Communication (GSM, from the original name, Groupe 
Speciale Mobile), 2.5G, CDMA, 3G and 4G. All of these technologies are 
different in specification but operate on the same basic principal and are 
fundamentally the same to the user. As such, all of these implementations can be 
referred to in a generic sense simply as ‘mobile telephony’. 
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Traditional communication technologies operate using a style of network called a 
circuit switched network; this operational paradigm has not changed significantly 
since its widespread adoption. The circuit switched network paradigm is based on 
a fixed bandwidth connection between two endpoints (Davidson, Paters, Bhatia, 
Kalidinidi & Mukherjee, 2007). While major revolutions have occurred in 
telephony technology like the invention of automatic switches, the conversion 
from analogue to digital signalling and the invention of mobile telephony, the 
underlying architecture has always been a circuit switched network. 
In a circuit switched network, connections are made between endpoints by 
physically connecting a series of cables to form a single circuit. Early incarnations 
of the PSTN were based on a mesh network where all endpoints were connected 
to every other endpoint, creating a mesh of connections. The concept of a mesh 
network is intractable for more than a small number of endpoints (Wallingford, 
2005). To allow for an arbitrary number of endpoints in a scalable manner, 
switches are used to switch one endpoint’s connection to any other endpoint. The 
role of switches in a circuit switched network is to physically connect and 
disconnect cables in order to establish a circuit between the two endpoints. The 
circuit need only exist for the duration of a call; in this way, less physical 
infrastructure is required for a greater number of endpoints. The first manual 
switch came into operation in 1878 where a person would physically connect 
different circuits together. The automatic switch was invented in 1891 negating 
the need for a human operator in favour of an electronic signalling system 
(Dryburgh & Hewett, 2005). In a modern setup, the PSTN contains a hierarchy of 
switches. At the lowest level in the hierarchy each endpoint connects to an office 
exchange switch. A series of office exchanges will in turn connect to a tandem 
Higher 
Layer 
Tandem 
Switches
Local 
Tandem 
Switches
Local 
Tandem 
Switch
 
Figure 2: Simple Overview of the PSTN. Based on diagram from Davidson 
et al. (2007) 
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switch which will then connect to a higher level switch (Davidson et al., 2007) 
Figure 2 depicts a typical version of a PSTN network. When a circuit is 
established between two endpoints, it only needs to be routed as high as necessary 
in the network. Additionally, physical infrastructure may be installed between 
office exchanges where traffic volume is sufficient. This allows traffic flows to be 
localised and negates the need for large volumes of traffic to be routed through 
the higher level switches (Davidson et al., 2007). 
From early implementations of manual switches and analogue signals, the PSTN 
has developed into a monolithic and highly complex digital network where 
switching is performed automatically (Davidson et al., 2007; Sicker & 
Lookabaugh, 2004). Much of the complexity of the network is due to the myriad 
of services that are available such as voice mail, call waiting and automatic 
callback. As the endpoints in the network have no processing capability, the core 
of the network is responsible for implementing all of the service logic. 
In supporting all of the functions required of traditional communication systems, 
the various components of the network must communicate with each other in 
order to appropriately carry out their required functions. When manual switching 
was in use, the initiator of the call signaled to the operator using a hand crank that 
would light a bulb on the operator’s desk. The operator would then talk to the 
calling party to find out where the call was to be routed and would subsequently 
perform the required actions (Dryburgh & Hewett, 2005). By talking to each other 
the users of the system could setup the network to fulfill the primary goal i.e. 
makes a telephone call to another endpoint. Automatic switching fulfills the same 
goals without human intervention and uses a signaling protocol to do this. The 
PSTN uses a signaling system called Signaling System Number 7 (SS7), mobile 
telephony commonly uses an extended version of SS7 (Dryburgh & Hewett, 
2005). Signaling within the core of the network is possible as the core systems are 
all intelligent. Signaling between the core and the endpoints within the PSTN is 
not possible, as the endpoints do not have the capability to process such signals. 
Mobile telephony has had much more scope to evolve as the endpoints have 
processing and storage capability. 
2.3 Contemporary Communication Technologies 
Contemporary communication technologies are those that use the Internet to 
transfer data between endpoints. This designation is appropriate as they are the 
revolutionary form of the long existing traditional communication technologies. 
The Internet is a packet switched network that is fundamentally different to that of 
the circuit switched networks used by traditional communication technologies. 
While circuit switched networks are inherently based on the concept of a 
connection that exists between two end-points, the Internet has no such 
conception (Black, 2002). In a circuit switched network, a connection that is 
created is leased for a period of time and for that duration the allocated bandwidth 
is wholly dedicated to that connection regardless of how much is actually being 
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used. In a packet switched network, only bandwidth that is required for 
transmitting the message content is used. 
Like traditional communication networks, packet switched networks also are 
comprised of interconnected switches. However, the switches do not connect 
circuits; they are simply responsible for receiving and then ‘forwarding’ discreet 
‘chunks’ of data called packets. Instead of a dedicated, fixed bandwidth 
connection between the endpoints, the packets are sent through the network, from 
switch to switch, getting closer to the destination with each step. This is analogous 
to the postal service where physical cables are akin to haulage routes, switches to 
post offices (or a postal distribution centre) and packets to letters. When a letter is 
sent over the postal network, there is no ‘connection’ between the sender and 
receiver. The letter/packet is forwarded through the network to a post 
office/switch that is closer to its destination with each step. In this way, an end-
point can send data to multiple discreet endpoints at the same time without using 
additional infrastructure. Similarly, an endpoint can receive data from multiple 
discreet endpoints simultaneously. However, unlike a circuit switched network, 
the Internet cannot guarantee delivery of data, the network makes the “best effort” 
it can to deliver the payload (Black, 2002). The basic functionality of the Internet 
is largely useless on its own. To increase its utility, a range of protocols is used on 
top of the basic structure. This is the same concept of layered services discussed 
in section 0, but used in a different context. Such protocols at the lower level are 
used for sending messages that span over a range of packets (sequencing), 
guaranteeing delivery and allowing for multiple discreet message streams. At the 
higher level, there are many protocols for implementing application specific 
functions such as the World Wide Web.  
 
So far, the discussion of contemporary communication technologies has focused 
on the underlying network and little on the communication service aspect. The 
discussion of the carriage service aspect is separate from the carrier aspect as the 
two parts are quite distinct. The Internet is not designed to carry any particular 
type of data and human-to-human communications is only one use. 
 
Figure 3: An example of a VoIP call. The broken line represents  signaling 
sent to setup the call. The unbroken line represents the media (content) that 
is sent between the VoIP network endpoints. 
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Communication services are implemented with protocols that are carried by the 
Internet. These higher-level protocols are generally developed for a specific 
purpose such as VoIP or Instant Messaging. A communication system is 
comprised of one or more protocols sent between one or more endpoints to fulfill 
the function of communication. The endpoints can be any device that understand 
the required protocols; both software and hardware endpoints are common. An 
example of such a system is a VoIP phone network. If a call is placed between 
two VoIP network endpoints, several protocols may be used for call management 
(e.g. setup and teardown) and for transferring the content. The VoIP endpoints 
may be a hardware phone and a software application both of which ‘understand’ 
the required protocols. Figure 3 shows an example of a VoIP network. The solid 
and dotted lines indicate different protocols used in the network. 
As with traditional communication networks, signaling does occur within a packet 
switched network however the purpose is very different. The switches in packet 
switched networks need to be able to forward packets closer their destination. 
They generally have many physical connections to other switches in the network 
and must be able to decide where to forward each packet. Routing protocols are 
used to build information stores about a network that is used to make packet-
forwarding decisions. The signaling within the network has nothing specifically to 
do with the communication technologies (or any other technologies) using the 
network.  
2.4 Traditional vs Contemporary Communication Technologies 
The exploration of the operation of traditional and contemporary communication 
technologies in the previous sections results in a clear distinction of the major 
fundamental difference, namely the types of networks over which they operate. 
The functional difference between the technologies however, is deeper than just 
the underlying network operation. At the lowest level, the physical infrastructure 
of a packet switched network is similar to that of a circuit switched network in 
that there is a network of cables connected together with switches; it is how the 
networks are used that has the significant impact on communication technologies. 
Circuit switched networks as a concept has been in place for a long time. The 
original PSTN system contained no logic besides that of the human beings in 
within the network. When automatic switching was introduced, the intelligent 
humans were replaced with intelligent machines to fulfill the same role. A highly 
simplistic signaling system was added to the endpoints to replace the dialogue 
with the operator. Through the development of traditional communication 
technologies, the complexity of the core systems has grown while the endpoints 
have evolved little. In supporting the functions for which it was designed – the 
provision of voice communication – traditional communication networks perform 
adequately. However, the provision of new function and features is difficult due 
to the limited endpoints. 
The Internet as a packet switched network was not built for a particular high-level 
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function. Its role is generic, centered on carrying packets of data between 
endpoints. In this way, the Internet is a generic data transfer medium. Traditional 
communication systems are limited by the complexity of the core systems, the 
simplicity of the endpoints and the limited signaling ability between. Systems 
built on the Internet do not have this problem as there is no limitation to what the 
Internet can carry between the endpoints. This difference can be described as the 
logic shift property. The provision of communication services over any network 
requires intelligent components that are responsible for implementing the 
application logic. In traditional communication systems such as the PSTN, all of 
the logic is comprised in the complex and intelligent core while the endpoints are 
“quite stupid” (Cherry, 2005). When additional functionality is added to the 
PSTN system (e.g. call waiting), the core systems’ logic needs to be 
reprogrammed, however functionality cannot be added to the simple endpoint. In 
contrast to the logic-centric traditional communication networks, the Internet has 
relatively simple core systems (although are by no means ‘stupid’) and complex 
endpoints. The logic in contemporary communication systems is at the ‘outside’ 
of the network. Contemporary communication technologies use the Internet but 
are independent from it. Changing or updating the communication services has no 
effect on the underlying network. Another way to look at the logic shift property 
is that all of the logic of the system is comprised within the carriage service where 
in traditional communication technologies, the logic resides in both the carriage 
and the carrier service. 
The independence of the carriage service from the carrier service in contemporary 
communication technologies, caused by the logic shift property, can be defined as 
the service decoupling property. In traditional communication services, the carrier 
and carriage services are tightly coupled. The telecommunications provider 
generally controls both and conceptually supplies them as a single service; this is 
a product of the logic centric network. In both PSTN and mobile telephone 
systems, the user cannot choose to use their carriage service over a different 
carrier service independently of the providers. In contemporary communication 
systems however, the two service layers are independent. Internet-based 
communication technologies are functionally separate from the underlying carrier 
service and therefore can easily be ‘moved’ when required. In general2, the user is 
able to use their carriage service over any available carrier service and a carrier 
service may carry any carriage service.  
The logic shift property also propagates a number of other significant differences 
between traditional and contemporary technologies. As the endpoints are complex 
devices and are responsible for some of the functionality of the network, users 
                                                 
2
 It is possible that the carriage and carrier service can be bound in contemporary 
communication services. For instance, a VoIP phone may derive its service number 
from the physical port to which it is connected. However, this is an artificial 
constrained added by the communication provider. 
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may be able to influence how the endpoint functions. In traditional 
communication technologies, the user has little control over the endpoint, as there 
is little that can be configured. This difference can be referred to as the endpoint 
control property and may give users greater control over a contemporary 
communication network than what they might have in traditional networks. 
Another significant change is the ability for entities to supply communication 
services. Traditional communication systems are extremely complex and require 
expensive hardware and software. For this reason, traditional telecommunication 
services are generally supplied by companies to consumers as a business. 
Providers of contemporary communication services however, need not invest in 
expensive hardware or software. This difference can be defined as the lower 
barrier to entry property. An issue related to this is the ability for providers of 
contemporary communication services to distribute their service globally; this is 
referred to as the borderless supply property. Providers do not need to have any 
physical presence in locations where their product is used, nor do they need to 
have physical infrastructure. This is very different to providers of traditional 
communication services who generally require both physical infrastructure and 
presence in localities where they distribute their product.  
The legislation that relates to communication services is another notable 
difference between traditional and contemporary communication technologies. 
All traditional communication services are comprised of carrier and carriage 
service providers as defined under the Telecommunications Act. In Australia, 
only certain types of Internet-based communication services are deemed CSPs 
under the Telecommunications Act. Non TA-CSPs do not have any obligations 
under the Telecommunications Act or the TIA Act. Regulation of communication 
networks is overseen by the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA). With the rise in popularity of contemporary communication services, 
ACMA has taken steps to ensure that where contemporary communication 
technologies are supplied as replacement to traditional communication systems, 
they are classified as TA-CSPs. ACMA has defined four classifications of VoIP: 
1. Peer to peer – Internet only, calls do not use the traditional 
telephone network, the public switched telephone network 
(PSTN) 
2. VoIP Out – a service where calls can be made from the VoIP 
network to the PSTN 
3. VoIP In – a service which allow calls to be made from the PSTN 
to the VoIP service using a telephone number 
4. Two way – a service which allows calls to be made both ways 
between the VoIP service and the PSTN using telephone 
numbers (Australian Communications and Media Authority, 
2010b). 
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The ACMA web site  states that all categories with the exception of the peer-to-
peer category are “generally” classified as carriage services (It is unclear exactly 
what is meant by “generally” as no distinction is made in any of the relevant 
legislation) (Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2010b). Where a 
contemporary communication service is deemed by ACMA as a carriage service, 
the provider has the same obligations as traditional CSPs. Where the service falls 
outside of this classification, it can also be regarded as an Internet application. 
This difference between traditional and contemporary communication 
technologies can be designated as the Internet application property. 
The Internet as a carrier service allows communication systems that operate and 
behave very differently from traditional systems. At an implementation level, the 
primary difference is the style of network; traditional communication systems use 
a circuit switched network where contemporary communication systems use the 
Internet, which is a packet switched network. The Internet does not have one 
particular function; it is generic in its nature. For this reason, the intelligent parts 
in contemporary communication systems reside at the endpoints of the network; 
this is the logic shift property. The logic shift property is important to understand 
as it gives rise to another four properties of contemporary communication 
networks: the service decoupling property, the endpoint control property, the 
lower barrier to entry property and the borderless supply property. These 
properties of contemporary communication technologies are important they are 
responsible for the differences in the two types of technology on a functional 
level. This paper explores the investigation methods used by law enforcement and 
the defined functional differences hold the key to the utility and effectiveness of 
the methods. 
3. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNICATIONS 
This section deals with the way that communication technology is investigated. It 
first looks at the range of methods that law enforcement currently uses for 
obtaining information and at the techniques used for discovering what services a 
target is using, or who is using a given target. It then looks at the three primary 
methods for obtaining data about a target’s use of communication technologies: 
communication interception, access of stored information and post-mortem 
analysis. Section 0 explores how the methods are currently applied to traditional 
communication technologies. It further looks at the application of the methods to 
contemporary communication technologies. The contemporary communication 
properties identified in 0 are used to identify where the incompatibilities lie. 
Finally, a case study shows examples of the application of communications 
interception, access of stored information and post mortem analysis where used 
by law enforcement. The case study further provides a hypothetical situation in 
each instance that seeks to explore the impact on the outcomes where targets used 
Internet-based communication technologies. 
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3.1 Lawfully Obtaining Information 
In law enforcement investigations, it is common that a target’s use of 
communication services should be explored. Information about the use of a 
telecommunication service can be one of two types, the content of the actual 
communication or data about content; the latter is called metadata. In both cases 
this data can be obtained from two sources, the core systems of the 
communication system or from the target if the data is in their possession 
(generally residing on the endpoint device). In Australia a person’s right for their 
data to remain private is covered under various acts of legislation with the Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act) chief among these. The location of the data, within 
either the network or the endpoint, dictates the affecting laws under which the 
data can be recovered. When data are in the possession of the owner, the rights of 
that person concerning the data are the same as with anything, material or 
otherwise, that is owned by that person. Items owned by a person cannot simply 
be acquired without their permission or lawful request (search and seizure). When 
data are in the possession of the owner, it is irrelevant (in relation to legislation) 
whether the data are content or metadata; the law is applied equally to both. 
However, when data are obtained from within the Australian 
Telecommunications Network (ATN) (the infrastructure owned by the listed TA-
carriers), there are three acts of legislation that govern a user’s right to privacy, 
the TIA Act, the Privacy Act of 1988 and the Telecommunications Act. The TIA 
Act covers the interception and access of the content of communications as they 
pass over the ATN. The Telecommunications Act and the Privacy Act cover the 
privacy of a user’s personal information, which includes their personal particulars 
and communication metadata. 
3.1.1 Communication Interception 
Access to communication content while it resides within the ATN is governed by 
the TIA Act. The TIA Act defines this type of data as a “communication” and is 
defined as follows: 
communication includes conversation and a message, and any part of a 
conversation or message, whether: 
 
(a) in the form of: 
     (i) speech, music or other sounds; 
     (ii) data; 
     (iii) text; 
     (iv) visual images, whether or not animated; or 
     (v) signals; or 
(b) in any other form or in any combination of forms 
(Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act  1979). 
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Stored communications that reside on the ATN are also specifically accounted for 
under the TIA Act. A stored communication is one that is in transit between 
endpoints but is temporarily stored within the network. An example of a stored 
communication in this context is an SMS message that has not yet been 
transferred to the recipient’s mobile phone. Prior to the Telecommunications 
(Interception) Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), such communications were not 
considered as ‘in transit’. Stored communications then fell under the 
Telecommunications Act as retained data allowing easier access by law 
enforcement (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2006b). 
Intercepting communications en-route over the ATN is illegal. In order for law 
enforcement to lawfully to do this, the TIA Act provides exemptions. The TIA 
Act contains a warrant regime in Chapter 2 Part 2-5 and Chapter 3, the latter 
relating specifically to stored communications (Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act  1979). Warrants for interception of communication content can 
be issued by authorised eligible authorities. Such authorities, nominated by the 
Attorney General, may be judges or members of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT) (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2006c). Warrants for interception 
of communication can only be authorised for crimes that are considered “serious”. 
Serious crimes are explicitly defined in section 5D of the TIA Act. In protecting 
the privacy of users of telecommunication systems, the TIA Act also specifies a 
range of issues of which the issuer of the warrant must be satisfied before 
providing authorisation. The authorising judge or AAT member must consider 
matters such as “how much the privacy of any person or persons would be likely 
to be interfered” and “the gravity of the conduct constituting the offence [that is 
being investigated]” (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2006c). 
The content of a communication may be considered the ‘holy grail’ of 
information when investigating a target however the protection law surrounding 
access to this information is very clear. In comparison to retained data (discussed 
in 0), gaining lawful access to content data is much more difficult. Where clear 
need is established and proper judicial requirements are fulfilled, law enforcement 
can gain much information about targets and their activities. For this reason, this 
information gathering method is very powerful and an invaluable asset. 
3.1.2 Access of Stored Information 
In obtaining data from within the telecommunications network, law enforcement 
may collect a user’s particulars or information about a user’s activity that has been 
stored by the provider. Telecommunication providers collect various types of 
information about users and their activity. Depending on jurisdiction, data may be 
collected for business purposes of the provider (e.g. billing) or legislation may 
force the collection and retention of such data. In the latter case, such legislation 
may be consumer focussed for such requirements as itemised billing or for 
national security purposes. In 2006, the European Union (EU) adopted a directive 
that specifies policy for retention of such data (Council Directive (CE)  
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2006/24/EC). The Australian Government is currently considering adopting laws 
based on this directive (Grubb, 2010a, 2010b; LeMay, 2010). This would force 
some providers to store certain information for definite a period of time for 
increasing the power of law enforcement investigations. Communication 
metadata (such as the user’s personal details) and activity details (such as call 
records) are considered personal information. Under ordinary circumstances, the 
average person has a right to privacy concerning their own personal information. 
The Australian Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 defines personal information 
as:  
information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a 
database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, 
about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, 
from the information or opinion” (Privacy Act  1988). 
The collection of retained data in a telecommunications system is governed by the 
Telecommunications Act and the Privacy Act. Section 13 of the 
Telecommunications Act states that “... carriage service providers ... must protect 
the confidentiality of information that relates to ... (c) the affairs or personal 
particulars of other persons” (Telecommunications Act  1997). There are no 
specific definitions under the law of what retained data is, however the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute defines five categories of retained data: 
subscriber, usage, equipment, network element and additional service usage 
(European Telecommunications Standards Institute, 2009). Electronic Frontiers 
Australia (EFA) further define examples of retained data from the from an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) point of view (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 
2006a). 
Before employing information gathering methods to gain either content or 
metadata, law enforcement investigators may need to identify services that are 
used by the target, or may need to identify the target that uses a particular service. 
In Australia, all traditional communication technologies that connect to the ATN 
are assigned a number, generally referred to as a ‘phone number’. Law 
enforcement has access to the Integrated Public Number Database (IPND). The 
IPND is a database of all numbers that can be used within the ATN for connecting 
carriage services. The database records current information about the numbers 
and includes information like the current user’s details (name, address etc), the 
issuing carriage service provider, whether the number is unlisted and if the 
recorded address of the number is likely to be located at the customers service 
address. The IPND has several functions. The primary function is for the public 
and is to provide directory assistance. For this purpose, phone numbers can be 
supplied given an entity’s particulars (the term entity is used here, as the ‘owner’ 
of a number may not be a person). The use of system in reverse, called a reverse 
lookup, is not allowed to the public, as this would contravene the privacy 
legislation. However, reverse lookups can be used for emergency services in order 
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to help locate users based on the originating number. Law enforcement agencies 
are also allowed to use the IPND this way. Access to the database for this reason 
is governed in the same way as other personal information stored by a carrier or 
CSP (under section 13 of the Telecommunications Act) (Australian 
Communications and Media Authority, 2010a). 
For the lawful collection of retained data stored by telecommunications providers, 
the Telecommunications Act provides law enforcement agencies with several 
avenues. Any request for data made under law, such as a warrant, requires the 
carrier or carriage service provider to supply the relevant data. Section 282 of part 
13 of the Act however, provides means for data acquisition that does not need to 
be made via a warrant. Law enforcement agencies can make requests to the 
provider that may be either certified or uncertified. Certified requests are issued 
with certification from a senior officer who declares that the disclosure is 
“reasonably necessary”. Uncertified requests are not issued with such 
certification and provider must be satisfied that the disclosure is “reasonably 
necessary” for the enforcement of criminal law (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 
2006a; Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2010c). In carrying out 
such requests, service providers must also comply with the Privacy Act. 
There are several avenues that law enforcement can use to recover stored 
information about targets and their use of communication. The information is 
protected by law but in general, where there is a clear need, the information can 
be obtained with relative ease. In comparison to interception of communication 
content, the safeguards for accessing this type of information are less stringent. 
However, personal particulars and records of activity are in general considered 
less private that the content of communications. 
3.1.3 Post Mortem Analysis 
During the course of a lawful investigation, data may be seized from a suspect 
with the use of a warrant or during an arrest. In relation to traditional 
communications, items that may be seized are anything that contains information 
about the user’s activities. An example of this is the seizure of mobile telephones 
that include phone call records and SMS messages (this is both content and 
metadata). A warrant is usually required as is the case with any search and 
seizure. Warrants for lawful search and seizure laws vary between different states 
and the federal jurisdiction. In South Australia, warrants can be issued under 
several acts of legislation most notably the Summary Offences Act of 1953 and 
the Crimes Act of 1914. Australian federal law enforcement can obtain warrants 
for search and seizure under the Commonwealth’s Crimes Act of 1914. 
3.2 Application of Investigation Methods 
In order to determine how the functional differences between traditional and 
contemporary communication technologies affect the methods used by law 
enforcement, it is necessary to look at how these methods are applied. In section 
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0, six properties of contemporary communication technologies were defined. 
These properties represent functional differences between traditional and Internet-
based communication technologies; Table 1 recaps the meaning of these 
properties. 
Table 1: Properties of Contemporary Communication Technologies 
representing the functional differences to traditional communication 
technologies 
Logic shift property The ‘intelligent’ parts of the networks are 
conceptually located at the outside of the 
network. 
Endpoint control 
property 
The endpoints of the network are more 
intelligent and have increased flexibility and 
configurability. 
Service decoupling 
property 
The carrier and carriage service are 
independent rather than coupled as a single 
indecomposable package. 
Lower barrier to entry 
property 
The provision of carriage services is 
inexpensive and requires low technical 
knowledge allowing services to be supplied by 
more entities  
Borderless supply 
property 
Carriage service providers do not need local 
infrastructure or presence in order to supply 
service effectively. 
Internet application 
property 
The carriage service is categorised an ‘Internet 
application’ and therefore is not bound as a 
carriage service under the Telecommunications 
Act 1997. 
 
After exploring how the methods are applied to traditional communication 
technologies, a direct comparison can be made with contemporary 
communication technologies. The identified properties are used to highlight 
where the incompatibilities between the target technology and the methods lie. 
3.2.1 Communication Interception 
The use of communications interception by law enforcement is a highly effective 
and robust method. This robustness is afforded due to the legislation under the 
TIA Act that forces TA-CSPs to provide and maintain an interception capability. 
When this method is used to intercept the content of traditional communication 
technologies, there is little the user can do to prevent this from happening as it is 
dictated by the endpoint control property. End-to-end encryption is one possibility 
however this is uncommon because it requires expensive hardware that is not 
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easily accessible to the layperson.  
The application of content interception is quite different in relation to 
contemporary communication services. When considering this issue, the Internet 
application property must be taken into account. Where the carriage service is not 
deemed an Internet application, it falls under the Telecommunications Act and the 
situation is similar to that of traditional communications; however, the endpoint 
control property does not apply, affording the user greater flexibility to alter the 
operation of the service. The service decoupling property does not greatly affect 
this situation as the CSP intercepts the data at the carriage level3. As with 
traditional communication systems, the users can employ end-to-end encryption 
over the service. Due to the endpoint control property this is much simpler to 
implement as it can be performed in software; specialist hardware is not required. 
If users employ this method, collection of the content anywhere between the 
endpoints will result in only encrypted data; neither the service provider nor the 
law enforcement body will be able to easily recover the original communication. 
Note that encryption implemented by the CSP will not be an issue for law 
enforcement as the interception system must allow for collection of the 
unencrypted data. 
Where the contemporary communication service has the Internet application 
property, interception of the content may be very difficult. Due to the service 
decoupling property, the collection may occur at either the carrier (i.e. the Internet 
feed) or carriage level with very different results. Collection at the carriage level 
requires compliance the CSP. Without lawful directive, the CSP may not be 
willing to carry out such actions, or may not have the necessary facilities to do so. 
Due to the lower barrier to entry property, the provider may be very different to 
that of a traditional communications provider. Providers of traditional 
communication services are generally locally based and sizable companies and in 
many cases have no reason to hinder police investigations. Providers of Internet 
application type communication services may be internationally based (borderless 
supply property) with no local presence or may even be a single individual with 
an amateur setup. Such providers can supply the same service as that of a local 
provider but may have less need or ability to provide assistance to law 
enforcement. The locality or size of the operation does not dictate the level of 
assistance that would be afforded to law enforcement officials, however it may be 
factor in many cases. Interception of this type of communication service at the 
carrier level negates the need to work in conjunction with the CSP. The issue with 
this approach is the carriage service mobility due to the service decoupling 
property. Any use of the carriage service over a carrier service not being 
                                                 
3
 Interception of content at the carrier level is possible but unlikely in the situation 
where it can be performed at the carriage level. However, if this does occur, the 
problems are the same as those described in the situation where the carriage service is 
not considered a carriage service as defined under the Telecommunications Act. 
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intercepted will be missed. Encryption is also a problem with this approach as 
both end-to-end encryption and that implemented by the service provider will 
render the approach ineffective. 
3.2.2 Access of Stored Information 
The access of stored information, like communication interception, is a robust 
data acquisition method. It is also supported in legislation by the 
Telecommunications Act. Law enforcement has avenues for accessing the 
information from the service provider both with and without a warrant. For the 
user of the communication service, there are few methods to avoid having this 
information collected. For the collection of personal particulars, the user may be 
able to obtain certain services with a false or alternate name preventing law 
enforcement from accessing the real information. For activity-related information 
(such as call data records or SMS activity records), there is no way to prevent the 
CSP from recording this information.  
Again, when considering access of stored information as applied to contemporary 
communication services, the Internet application property must be considered 
separately. Where the implementation is not an Internet application, the situation 
will be the same as with traditional communication technologies. For user activity 
data, neither the service decoupling property nor the endpoint control property 
presents an issue for law enforcement as the CSP must be able to receive this data 
to perform the functions of the system (i.e. one cannot encrypt the intended 
destination of the communication as the communication system could not use this 
information to perform its functions). With the support of the 
Telecommunications Act, law enforcement agencies will always be able to access 
this information lawfully. Personal particular information, as with traditional 
communication technologies, must be collected by the CSP however in some 
cases it may be possible to provide false information. 
Where the carriage service is an Internet application, law enforcement many be 
restricted in its ability to collected retained information. Such providers do not 
have any legal obligation to collect either information about users or information 
about their activities. Even where personal information is collected, police have 
limited options in forcing the provider to share the information. This effect is 
predominately due to the lower barrier to entry and the borderless supply 
properties of contemporary communication technologies. The former allows 
almost any person or company to offer services who may have no need for 
collecting such information, or may even explicitly not collect it as a ‘feature’ for 
a secure communication service.  
 
3.2.3 Post Mortem Analysis 
The application of post-mortem analysis for gaining information about 
communication technologies is quite different to the other common methods. 
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Post-mortem analysis relies on obtaining information from the source rather than 
via a service provider (or service provider’s infrastructure). The information 
gained may be a mix of content, metadata and other types of communication and 
non-communication data. Unlike the other methods, there are no laws specifically 
supporting access of communication data by this method. Law enforcement 
practitioners must rely on good methods for extracting all of the information 
available on the target device. 
In traditional communication technologies, post-mortem analysis is only useful 
for the analysis of mobile phones; PSTN endpoints have no processing or storage 
capabilities. Traditionally there have been little protections from the use of sound 
post-mortem analysis techniques on mobile phones; protections such as a PIN on 
the phone and SIM card are generally quite rudimentary to bypass with the aid of 
the telecommunication companies and forensic software and hardware. Full disk 
encryption has not generally been available to users on most mobile phone 
handsets. 
The shift towards contemporary communications is somewhat blurred concerning 
mobile phones. The growth of smart phones has morphed the average mobile 
phone into a small but powerful computer. Smart phones still generally support 
traditional communication functions but also commonly support Internet and user 
installable applications and therefore also support contemporary communication 
technologies. The increased use of such devices for holding personal data has 
amplified demand for encryption and the increased power has supported this. 
Technically strong and properly supported encryption is an issue for law 
enforcement as decrypting may be infeasible. Furthermore, contemporary 
communication services used via the mobile phone may not use the local storage 
media and instead opt for a remote storage location. While analysis may confirm 
the service is in use, there may be no feasible methods for recovering the data 
stored on the remote server.  
3.3 Case Study 
In order to provide an overview of how the uptake of contemporary 
communication technologies may change the way in which investigations are 
conducted or may unfold, several cases are studied where information from 
communication systems were used. The case study does not seek to assert that the 
results would have varied in the referenced cases should contemporary 
communications technologies have been used, but rather it seeks to provide a 
thought experiment to assess the possibilities. 
3.3.1 Case 1 
This case involved a conspiracy to import illegal substances in commercial 
quantities (El-Jalkh, Antoine v R [2009] NSWCCA 139  2009). Law enforcement 
officials were notified of the conspiracy by an informant and subsequently 
obtained a warrant for the interception of communications on the target’s mobile 
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telephone service; the collection included both voice calls and SMS to and from 
the target. Both the SMS content and voice recordings from the interception were 
used in the trial to establish the facts of the case. 
If the key parties in the above scenario had been using contemporary 
communication technologies, the investigators may not have been able to collect 
as much relevant communication content. An application such as Skype could 
have been used for placing phone calls that were secure from interception. 
Interception of the target’s Internet service (carrier level) would have provided no 
benefit due to the encryption. Interception may still have been possible if it 
occurred on another target’s telephone service where Skype was used to place a 
call to, or receive a call from that service. SMS or SMS-like messages could also 
have been sent using Skype or other applications that provided encryption. 
Furthermore, the offender could have used alternate Internet connections to send 
data providing a further barrier to interception. 
While the investigators collected evidence from a variety of sources including 
witness testimony and hidden recording devices, the case may have been 
weakened had they not been able to intercept the content of communications used 
for carrying out the crime and present it as evidence. 
3.3.2 Case 2 
In a case involving a homicide, stored records of phone call and SMS activity 
were used as evidence (R v Wilkinson (No. 5) [2009] NSWSC 432  2009). In this 
case, a pattern of activity was used to establish information about the mindset of 
the offender. By using source, destination and time information about the 
communications from the target’s telephone service, the prosecution was able to 
demonstrate to the court the “intensity” of the relationship between two people. It 
was further able to indicate the state of mind of the offender by a change in the 
pattern of sent text messages around the time of a significant event. While the 
information was not used as a single piece of evidence, it was important 
information used to support the facts of the case. 
In the above case, if the offender had used an Internet-based communication 
technology, the pertinent evidence may not have been available. Instead of 
standard SMS messages from a traditional mobile phone service, the offender 
could have used an application such as Skype to send SMS or instant messages. In 
such a case, the investigators may not have been able to access records about the 
communications between the two people thus potentially limiting the 
prosecution’s case.  
3.3.3 Case 3 
In a case involving a person being charged for the supply of a prohibited drug, the 
contents of a text message on the target’s mobile phone were used to support the 
prosecutors case that the person was a supplier of drugs (Zahrooni v R; Director 
of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Zahrooni [2010] NSWCCA 252  2010). On 
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arresting the offender for the possession of prohibited substances, a search of his 
mobile phone revealed an SMS text message soliciting the procurement of drugs. 
The content of the message was subsequently used in convicting the offender. 
The above case relied on a physical examination of the offender’s device. The 
offender did not employ any countermeasures in order to stop examination of data 
on the device. If the offender had have been using an Internet-based 
communication technology, the retrieval of the evidence many not have been 
possible. Such an application may not store information on the local device and 
may have provided additional protection by forcing the user to supply credentials 
before being able to obtain the data. Additionally, the user may have been able to 
encrypt the contents of the storage volumes, protecting it from physical recovery 
of remnant information. Although such an application may not exist in this form 
currently, it would be easy for it to be designed and implemented. Such an 
application could include many measures that protect information for the specific 
purpose of avoiding law enforcement. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The digital age has seen a dramatic shift in the way that technology affects many 
aspects of daily life. As technology evolves, users will naturally gravitate towards 
the implementations that make their life easier, more convenient and more 
fulfilled. Communication tools are a prime example of the evolution of 
technology being embraced by both providers and users. The Internet has allowed 
the creation of novel communication services that surpass, in terms of 
functionality, traditional technologies such as the PSTN and mobile phones. 
While there are many advantages to explosion of new communication 
technologies through the community, there are several notable disadvantages. 
Among these is the ability for law enforcement to carry out information recovery 
during investigations effectively. Primarily, law enforcement needs 
methodologies for obtaining information about targets and their use of 
communication technologies. A set of sound and rigorous methods exist to target 
traditional technologies. However, newer Internet-based technologies are 
functionally very different and as a result, the existing methodologies that were 
previously quite effective are now largely incompatible for use on new and 
emerging communication technologies. 
The investigation of communication technologies is an important activity that law 
enforcement agencies carry out. Traditional communication technologies are so 
pervasive in society that many crimes will inevitably involve their use at some 
point. It is important that methodologies are rigorous and well designed in order 
to be effective. The consequences of methodologies that are not built on rigorous 
principals are dire. Missing or improperly obtained information may lead to 
incorrect conclusions or inadmissible evidence in a court of law. Over the 
extensive lifespan of traditional communication technologies, methodologies have 
been built that support the acquisition of information in a legally sound and 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(4) 
 
58 
 
rigorous manner. In obtaining information about the use of traditional 
communication technologies, police use a combination of communication 
interception, access of stored information and use of post-mortem analysis. Two 
major factors support these methods, legislation and the nature of the technology. 
The legislation is effective in allowing law enforcement to carry out certain 
activities but also in forcing service providers to operate in certain ways that 
support law enforcement (e.g. collecting certain types of information). The 
‘nature of the technology’ is more nuanced. It effectively relates to the low level 
of control the user has over the technology that largely prevents the users from 
circumventing law enforcement methods of obtaining information.  
The methodologies used for investigation of traditional communication 
technologies are well suited to their purpose. As the target technologies have 
existed for many years and have evolved little over this time, the methods have 
evolved and become sound and rigorous. However, they have also become 
specific to their intended use. This means they are inflexible and do not cope well 
with altered parameters. Internet based communication services are very different 
to traditional communication technologies. Primarily, where the operation of 
traditional communication technologies is very rigid, Internet-based technologies 
are highly variable. The methodologies that have developed for the investigation 
of traditional communication technologies may not be effective against 
contemporary communication technologies in many cases. 
Internet-based communication technologies can have several properties that 
reduce the utility of current investigation methods. The logic shift property was 
discussed as the root of many of the properties that cause the ineffectiveness of 
current methods. From this property, the endpoint control property, service 
decoupling property, lower barrier to entry property and the borderless supply 
property are propagated. The Internet application property is also a major 
influence in the potential effectiveness of law enforcement methodologies. Each 
of the identified properties affects the application of methods for obtaining 
information in different ways. The Internet application property was shown to be 
very influential in determining whether the service providers had to meet 
obligations under the relevant legislation. It was shown that where a 
communication service was not an Internet application, it was generally 
susceptible to the current law enforcement methods. It is possible that users with 
some technical skills could implement end-to-end encryption over the carriage 
service to prevent communication interception. Similarly skilled users could also 
use encryption products for encrypting media sources preventing post-mortem 
analysis. In all cases, access to stored information still applies as users can do 
nothing to prevent this. For the average user, or those not deliberately 
implementing measures to impede law enforcement, current investigation 
methods will be successful where the communication service is not an Internet 
application. 
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Law enforcement investigation methods where the carriage service is an Internet 
application were shown to be ineffective in many instances. When carrying out 
communications interception, the provider has no legal obligation to assist law 
enforcement. The use of interception at the carrier level circumvents the carriage 
service provider but the service decoupling property will mean that 
communications may be missed, and the use of encryption will render this 
approach ineffective. Another layer of complexity is added by the lower barrier to 
entry and the borderless supply properties that affect both communication 
interception and access of stored information. The carriage service provider could 
potentially be anyone located anywhere in the world. This may make even 
attempting to interface with the provider very difficult, let alone accessing the 
required information. These properties potentially allow the provision of services 
for the direct purpose of secure communication that cannot be intercepted or 
recovered by third parties; this is contrary to traditional communication services 
where such a service would be illegal. Even users with low technical skills could 
employ these services to utilise secure communication greatly increasing the 
potential user-base. 
The increasing complexity of end-user devices is another change that works 
against law enforcement methodologies. Many devices now have built in 
encryption that can be easily activated by even technically low-skilled users. This 
will prevent the use of post-mortem analysis to recover any information stored on 
the device. More highly skilled users can employ advanced techniques such as 
data obfuscation or plausible deniable encryption to add a layer of complexity to 
an investigation. 
The legislation supporting current methodologies and the inherent nature of 
traditional communication technologies provides an almost ‘ideal’ situation for 
law enforcement. However, contemporary communication technologies may 
always provide a challenge due to its very nature. Even with a widened scope of 
current laws to incorporate Internet-based carriage services in the same way as 
traditional carriage services, the lower barrier to entry and the borderless supply 
properties mean that such laws may be very difficult to enforce. 
Many of the functional differenced defined here will only have an impact on law 
enforcement in the ‘worse case’ scenario. When discussing why a given methods 
may not be applicable to an Internet-based communication implementation, a 
common theme was a lack of help, or active hindrance by the provider. The case 
study also assume worst case scenario assuming that encryption would be used or 
providers would not provide law enforcement with information. In many cases, 
Internet-based carriage service providers may not hinder law enforcement 
investigations and may in actively help. Anecdotal information suggests that law 
enforcement is often aided by the providers of Skype to recover both metadata 
and content. However, Internet-based communication technologies may still pose 
issues in other ways, like identifying that they are being used. 
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The functional differences between traditional and contemporary communication 
technologies have been defined as a set of properties that are inherent to the latter. 
These properties are the core reason that in many cases the current methods used 
by law enforcement for obtaining information about the use of communication 
technologies are ineffective. As the uptake of contemporary communication 
technologies increases, law enforcement will be under mounting pressure to 
investigate their use effectively. They require additional methods to fit in with the 
current methodologies for obtaining information where these technologies are 
being used. The defined properties provide a starting point for the exploration of 
future methods to add to existing methodologies. 
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